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Empirical Issues and Challenges for Multilevel 
Governance: The Case of the 2010 Vancouver 
Olympic Winter Games 
 
By Milena Parenti, Christian Rouillardii and Jean-Loup Chappeletiii 
 
Abstract 
How did a large network of over 600 actors successfully organize itself to serve a mega 
project dominated by three levels of government, even as control rested with a non-profit 
entity, included other sectors, and the governments involved did not normally work well 
together? The purpose of this paper is to examine how the three levels of government in 
Canada established a network to coordinate efforts for hosting the 2010 Vancouver 
Olympic Winter Games. This case study was built by means of documents and 
interviews, and supported by participant observations. The network was not found to be 
dense, but did include a multiplexity of ties (e.g., transactions, communications, 
collaborations, and coordinating bridges) by actors serving diverse strategic goals and 
scopes of work. The case was compared to data collected for the 2012 London Olympic 
Games to draw out key network governance coordination themes. Nine governance 
themes emerged associated with governance structure, processes, and evaluation: 
coordination mechanisms; internal engagement, momentum, and motivation; external 
transparency; formalization; balancing autonomy and interdependence; co-location; 
readiness exercises; political alignment; and time. The findings provide a framework for 
examining the governance of multi-level, multi-sectorial networks created to undertake 
a mega project and indicate how a network’s public and non-profit organizations’ 
activities and procedures can be influenced, modified, and impacted by the other actors 
(i.e., other public or non-profit organizations). 
 
Keywords: Governance, government, networks, Olympic Games, sport event management 
 
Résumé 
Comment un vaste réseau de plus de 600 acteurs a-t-il réussi à s'organiser pour soutenir 
un mégaprojet dominé par trois niveaux de gouvernement, alors même que le contrôle 
relevait d'une entité sans but lucratif, incluait d'autres secteurs et que les gouvernements 
concernés ne travaillaient normalement pas bien ensemble ? Cet article a pour objet 
d'examiner comment les trois ordres de gouvernement au Canada ont établi un réseau 
pour coordonner les interventions en faveur de la tenue des Jeux olympiques d'hiver de 
2010 à Vancouver. Cette étude de cas a été réalisée au moyen de documents et 
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d'entrevues, appuyée de l’observation participante. Le réseau, sans être dense, comprend 
néanmoins une multiplicité de liens (p. ex. transactions, communications, collaborations 
et ponts de coordination) entre les acteurs qui servent divers objectifs stratégiques et 
champs d'activité. Le cas a été comparé aux données recueillies pour les Jeux olympiques 
de 2012 à Londres afin de dégager les principaux thèmes relatifs à la coordination de la 
gouvernance en réseau. Neuf thèmes associés à la structure, aux processus et à 
l'évaluation de la gouvernance sont ressortis : mécanismes de coordination, engagement 
interne, dynamique et motivation, transparence externe, formalisation, équilibre entre 
autonomie et interdépendance, regroupement, exercices de préparation, alignement 
politique et temps. Les résultats fournissent un cadre pour l'examen de la gouvernance 
des réseaux multiniveaux et multisectoriels créés pour entreprendre un mégaprojet et 
indiquent comment les activités et les procédures des organismes publics et sans but 
lucratif d'un réseau peuvent être influencées, modifiées et subir les effets des autres 
acteurs (c'est-à-dire les autres organismes publics ou sans but lucratif). 
 
Mots-clés : Gouvernance, gouvernement, réseaux, Jeux Olympiques, gestion d'événements 
sportifs 
 
 
Introduction: Multi-Level, Multi-Sectoral Network Governance 
How can three levels of government that do not easily trust each other work together in 
a mega project? Moreover, how can they be successful when the organizing network has 
hundreds of public, for-profit, and non-profit actors? This situation is increasingly 
pervasive in our globalized society. We find such instances with World Expositions, 
G8/G20 gatherings, and responses to international issues (e.g., major virus outbreaks, 
recessions, global warming), Olympic Games, and the FIFA World Cup, to name but a 
few. Such major instances usually involve governments as key actors, but these 
governments do not necessarily have ultimate decision-making control. In certain 
instances, national or international non-governmental bodies (e.g., United Nations, 
International Olympic Committee) act as the lead organizations, network administration 
organizations (NAO) (Provan & Kenis, 2007), or transnational advocacy networks (Price 
1997). 
 
Examining governance is important because it demonstrates governments’ shift from 
state/hierarchy to markets/networks, with a concurrent increase in non-governmental 
actors’ power in directing societal policy decision, as well as expanding international 
market and financial flows (Bevir, 2011). Governance is more than management; it 
comprises economic, social, political, and cultural aspects (Bellina, 2009). Yet, most 
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studies, for better or for worse, focus on just one of these aspects, sticking to the technical, 
prescriptive/dogmatic level, such as corporate governance and its strong focus on board 
structure and composition of for-profit organizations (Bellina, 2009). Although providing 
valuable information, such studies have excluded important contextual and institutional 
aspects (e.g., cultural, social, and political elements). Current trends in networking, de-
verticalization, and business process outsourcing are argued to increase efficiency, and, 
employing the principles of good governance, are seen as “essential underpinnings for 
financial stability and economic growth” (Clarke & Branson, 2012, p. 1). Governance is 
thus dynamic, evolutionary, and multidimensional, thereby highlighting its 
appropriateness for examining multi-level and multi-sectoral networks. 
 
The purpose of this paper, then, is to understand how three Canadian governments 
(federal, provincial, and municipal) successfully managed a network to coordinate their 
efforts within a larger network for hosting the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. Involving both non-governmental and governmental actors, including 
federal, provincial, and municipal actors and stakeholders, this case not only makes it 
possible to better understand the governance of large sporting events on the international 
scene, but, first and foremost, it enables us to better grasp the complexity of multilevel 
governance in Canada. The case of the 2010 Olympic Winter Games also allows better 
understanding of how a private international regime such as the Olympic system 
manages to strongly influence established governments at multiple levels (Cutler, 1999; 
Chappelet & Kuebler, 2008). The sheer magnitude of the Olympics, its international 
nature, the heavy involvement of governments, and the level of public funding all 
compound these issues. 
 
Nine themes emerged surrounding the governance of a massive network centred on 
balancing autonomy and interdependence. The nine themes were then integrated into a 
framework for examining the governance of multi-level, multi-sectoral networks created 
to undertake a mega project and indicate how a network’s public and non-profit 
organizations’ activities and procedures can be influenced, modified, and impacted by 
other actors (i.e., other public or non-profit organizations). Beyond the salient issues of 
efficacy and efficiency, the democratic dimension is also a key concern here. The nature 
and extent of private influence over public institutions raises fundamental questions of 
transparency and accountability for all actors and/or stakeholders involved. This research 
will also help to better understand the empirical nature of contemporary democratic 
governance and its inherent reconfiguration of the porous boundaries between public 
and private spheres, as well as between actors within the public sphere itself.   
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This paper is structured as follows. We first provide an overview of relevant literature to 
our theoretical framework. This is followed by details of the context, and then a 
description of the data collection and analysis techniques. The results are then presented 
and discussed. The paper concludes with future directions. 
 
1. Research Context 
On 2 July 2003, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced that the City of 
Vancouver would host the 2010 Olympic Winter Games. Created on 30 September 2003, 
the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter 
Games (VANOC) had eight main divisions working towards hosting the Games. It was 
dissolved on 31 December 2010. The 2010 Olympic Winter Games took place 12–28 
February 2010 and included over 5,500 athletes and team officials from 82 nations/states, 
10,000 media representatives, 25,000 paid staff and volunteers, and 3.5 billion television 
viewers (International Olympic Committee, 2010). VANOC’s operating budget was 
CAN$1.884 billion and the Games’ capital budget, to which the federal and provincial 
governments contributed most of the funding, was CAN$603 million (The Vancouver 
Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, 2010). 
 
As with all other Olympic Games organizing committees, VANOC had only a short time 
(less than seven years) to prepare. As such, outsourcing to various stakeholders was 
required. Of interest for this study, four governments assisted VANOC: the Canadian 
federal government, the British Columbia provincial government, and the Vancouver 
(host of city sports) and Whistler (host of mountain sports) municipal governments. Each 
government had a number of departments involved, coordinated by a set of intra- and 
inter-governmental committees. The governments signed a Multi-Party Agreement 
(MPA) with VANOC to outline each partner’s responsibilities. The IOC now requires 
candidate cities to generate similar agreements, demonstrating the 2010 Winter Games’ 
approach to be a best practice for organizing committee-government relationships.  
 
Each government had its own goals for the Games. For example, the federal government 
focused on a whole-of-government approach (horizontal management) to pursue pan-
Canadian objectives such as athletic excellence, spreading the spirit of the Games across 
Canada, and indigenous people’s participation (Government of Canada, 2010). The 
provincial government was focused on province-wide commitments to economic 
development, sport development, and cultural legacies throughout the province (British 
Columbia Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games Secretariat, 2007). Both municipalities 
had not only legacies as objectives, but focused on being effective and strong partners, 
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service providers, regulators, and venue developers (Office of Olympic Operations, 2006; 
Resort Municipality of Whistler, 2007). 
 
Each of the four governments created a Games secretariat or office to coordinate their 
respective departments. A cross-government and cross-partner governance structure 
(including other Games partners, namely Canadian Olympic and Paralympic committees 
and Four Host First Nations Society) was also created via the setup of various committees 
(e.g., MPA Partners’ coordinating committee, Olympic and Paralympic Transportation 
Team). VANOC also created committees on which the partners and other stakeholders 
sat (e.g., master planning teams) (2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games Federal 
Secretariat, 2008). Thus, if we take the governments as the central focus or egos of the 
coordination network created for the planning and hosting of the 2010 Games, we find 
multiple levels (from local to international) and multiple sectors (public, non-profit, 
private) that needed to be effectively governed.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this study is composed of (democratic) governance, 
network theory/analysis, and sports event management concepts. Each is described 
below. 
 
2.1. Governance and Democratic Governance 
Governance analysis typically deals with a perceived shift from hierarchy and 
bureaucracy to markets and networks—that is, from a state-centric (government-led) 
phenomenon to a society-centric (interdependent actors) one. If governance often 
appears to be an umbrella notion, covering many meanings (multi-level governance, 
shared governance, good governance, corporate governance), as well as numerous 
elements (networks, institutions, communities, processes) (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007), the 
same does not hold true for democratic governance. Most public administration literature 
defines it along the twin lines of performance and accountability, with a complementary 
(and varying) emphasis on democratic participation (e.g., Callahan, 2007).  
 
In accordance to the perceived shift from hierarchy to networks, recent studies in public 
administration argue that state-centric approaches need to be replaced by more society-
centric approaches in order to better reflect and understand developments in the policy 
process. Encouraging citizens to be more active and engaged in policy processes can, in 
turn, increase transparency and accountability of public organizations. In this 
perspective, the rise of inter-dependent actors in the private sector, civil society, and other 
governments and legislatures cannot help but diminish the state’s autonomy and 
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capacity. In this scenario of relative marginalization of the state, performance and 
accountability issues become increasingly complex, but remain as crucial as ever to 
ensure the democratic nature of politico-administrative regimes (Bevir, 2006). Yet, the 
passage from state-centric to society-centric approaches only make sense inasmuch as the 
state/civil society dichotomy holds true. Arguably, a more satisfactory approach to 
democratic governance will question this dichotomy and the traditional assumptions 
made between performance, accountability, and transparency. Such an approach, 
emphasizing patterns or configurations of stakeholders’ governing capacities, appears to 
be tailor-made for the dynamic and complex nature of these multidirectional interactions, 
as well as the often-neglected resilient nature of hierarchy (Damgaard, 2006). As Bevir 
(2011) notes, “Practices of governance characteristically blur the boundaries between 
public and private, blending features of state, market and community; and they blur the 
boundaries between levels of government and between states, forging multijurisdictional 
and transnational patterns” (p. 16). 
 
Regarding governments and their policy networks, Enroth (2011) suggests that policy 
network research should see governance as territorially and institutionally unbound. 
Issues of interdependence, coordination, pluralism, accountability, participation, 
democracy, and autonomy therefore come into play. As such, there are links between 
governance and network literatures, as well as with issues found in organization theory 
(e.g., interdependence/coordination) (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Citizens, civil society, 
private organizations, and governments at all levels are partners operating in a network, 
exchanging and redistributing tasks and responsibilities. 
 
2.2. Network Theory and Analysis 
While the municipal, provincial, and federal governments have certain similar needs, 
they also differ in interests and scope, yet they must work closely together (Parent, 2008). 
These structural and jurisdictional diversities, coupled with the varying 
interrelationships within the government stakeholder group, makes this grouping a good 
starting point to understand VANOC’s stakeholder environment using network theory. 
Stakeholder (e.g., Rowley, 1997), public administration (e.g., Berry et al., 2004), and sport 
management (e.g., Quatman & Chelladurai, 2008) researchers call for a network analysis 
approach to understand the complex environment of an organization. Network theory 
(e.g., Gummesson, 2006; Iacobucci, 2008; Jurian & Erik-Hans, 2006) therefore helps move 
beyond dyadic ties to understand in greater depth one key stakeholder group—
government—and the network it built to coordinate efforts for the Olympic Games mega 
project.  
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A network is a set of organizations connected to each other in varying degrees based on 
prior contact and exchange. A network approach allows for multiple levels of analysis, 
where a description of both the node (e.g., government committee) and the relationship 
between nodes is possible and desired (Iacobucci, 2008). This is in perfect concordance 
with the present study as “governance refers to theories and issues of social coordination 
and the nature of all patterns of rule” (Bevir, 2011, p. 1). Networks can be characterized 
in terms of their density, hierarchy/centrality, types of relationships, quality of 
relationships, and multiplexity (Burt, 2000; Knoke & Yang, 2008; Provan, Veazie, Teufel-
Shone, & Huddleston, 2004). For example, relationships between network actors—the 
ties—can be characterized as strong or weak and of different types, such as transaction, 
communication, boundary penetration, instrumental, sentiment, authority/power, and 
kinship/descent (Knoke & Yang, 2008). 
 
2.3. Sports Event Management 
Understanding the complex nature of preparing and hosting a major sports event like the 
Olympic Games is only beginning. Parent (2008) indicates that sports event organizing 
committees evolve over three operational modes: planning (bid phase, business plan, 
operational plan, divisional work packages); implementation (venue plans, Games-time); 
and wrap-up (final report, legacy management). She also identifies thirteen issue 
categories that an organizing committee must manage, such as politics, visibility, 
financial, organizing, relationships, human resources, interdependence, and 
participation. Theodoraki (2007) suggests that Olympic Games organizing committees 
are a hybrid of divisionalized form and missionary organizations (also see Mintzberg, 
1979). Organizing committees move from work process standardization during the 
planning mode to output and skills standardization during implementation. 
Research in sporting events has generally focused on specific issues such as marketing, 
branding/image/sponsorship, tourism, economic impact, and socio-political and urban 
regeneration issues (e.g., Burbank, Andranovich, & Heying, 2001; Daniels & Norman, 
2003; Séguin, Richelieu, & O’Reilly, 2008). This study moves the understanding of sports 
event management from an issue-specific focus to an overarching issue, that of 
governance (mechanisms and processes), and from general stakeholder identification to 
broader stakeholder network characterization. 
 
3. Methods 
Case studies have proven to be especially valuable for providing in-depth knowledge of 
complex events as they unfold over time, particularly for under-examined issues and 
when researchers seek to develop new theoretical models (Yin, 2009). Case studies 
“emphasize the rich, real-world context” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25) of the 
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phenomenon under study, thus making such an approach ideal for studying VANOC 
and its stakeholders (particularly, the municipal, provincial, and federal governments). 
 
3.1. Sampling and Data Collection 
Based on discussions with the study’s government partner, the federal government, and 
the sheer complexity of the situation (over 312,000 civil servants spread across roughly 
one hundred departments in four governments), we focused our sampling unit attention 
on the inter-departmental committees and issues clusters that were created as the main 
coordination mechanisms due to the complex, “higher-level system within which lower-
level entities comprise the actors” (i.e., governments and civil servants) (Knoke & Yang, 
2008, p. 10).  
 
Data collection stemmed from two sources: archival material and interviews. For this 
paper, we focused our attention on materials specific to government. This included 
committees’ terms of reference, meeting minutes, annual and final reports, and other 
Games stakeholders’ documents that mentioned government, such as organizing 
committee internal documents (e.g., meeting minutes, memos, letters, final reports), 
stakeholder documents (e.g., annual reports, newspaper, and other media articles), and 
commemorative material (e.g., commemorative books). These documents provided 
information on mandates/objectives, issues dealt with, frequency of meetings, and 
representative departments on each committee. These were also necessary for identifying 
potential interviewees. Some documents were publicly available, but most governance-
related government documents (e.g., committee meeting minutes, terms of reference) 
were obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request. In total, 4,915 documents 
were analyzed. 
Interviewees were chosen on the basis of their high degree of knowledge of/involvement 
with the 2010 Games. This allowed us to obtain “unbiased data about long-term repeated 
patterns [and] to produce consensus answers to questions, which indicates greater 
validity” (Knoke & Yang, 2008, pp. 37–38). Snowball sampling was used when 
participants or the data indicated a need for more information to be gathered (i.e., until 
saturation was reached) (Miles & Huberman, 1994). We conducted 55 semi-structured 
interviews with 45 individuals after gaining our ethics certificate. Thirty-five interviews 
were conducted pre-Games (2008–2009) with civil servants from all four governments to 
get a sense of the coordination network and its operations. 
  
3.2. Data Analysis 
Archival material and interviews from the 2010 Vancouver Games were combined for 
analysis. First, network analysis was undertaken. To do so, all Vancouver documents and 
interviews were inductively coded to identify all relationships. Each relationship was 
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then described in an Excel table. The types of ties (Knoke & Yang, 2008) were used as a 
starting point, although emerging types were also found and considered. In all, 610 actors 
and 3,900 ties were identified and then transposed into an Excel matrix. Due to the large 
number of actors, the traditional 1-0 matrix could not be created for the whole network, 
as Excel does not allow sufficient columns. Such a matrix could only be done for the 
municipal and provincial levels. For the whole network, a basic matrix identifying 
relationships was created. Degree (number of ties), betweenness (ability to control 
information), and eigenvector (degree of importance) normalized centrality measures 
and were computed using the UCINET 6.0 network analysis software (Borgatti, Everett, 
& Freeman, 2002), as was density and in- and out-reach (see Bonacich, 1972; Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994). For the eigenvector measure to be robust, Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman 
(2002) recommend that the ratio of the highest eigenvalue to the next highest must be at 
least 1.5; our eigenvalue ratio was calculated to be 1.865, which was therefore robust. The 
NetDraw 2 (Borgatti, 2002) network analysis software program was used to visually 
represent the network using the software’s algorithm for the eigenvector centrality 
measurement. 
 
The interviews were then inductively coded using a constant comparison technique 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967) for recurring patterns (themes, ideas, concepts) associated with 
the governments’ network and their efforts to plan, implement, and coordinate their 
respective responsibilities. We engaged in first- and second-order coding to lead us to 
higher-order themes (Corley & Gioia, 2004). The first order coding included, for example, 
a variety of issues to handle: strategies, use of agreements, interdependence, 
performance, accountability, transparency, participation, hierarchical versus business 
approaches to the project, autonomy, and logistical/operational aspects. As noted earlier, 
an opportunity occurred to gather data from the London 2012 Games. We reviewed the 
London 2012 data for the same types of patterns. Those that could be found in both were 
noted and aggregated into categories based on relationships between concepts (e.g., 
freedom of information requests and engaging/gaining support from the community 
through being transparent/answering questions were aggregated into the external 
transparency category). Nine themes emerged as being consistently regarded as critical 
by the interviewees for the governance of such mega projects. Relationships between the 
categories were then determined, which resulted in our higher-order themes (see Figure 
3 below). 
 
4. Results 
I think complexity is the right word. I think it’s not complicated, but it’s complex. 
I think that when you’re talking about government involvement, specifically this 
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type of concept, and even the evolution of what I would call this concept of 
partnership (P43). 
 
The above characterizes the complex network that the host governments created to help 
plan and execute the Games, and the need to understand how such networks work for 
government operations. We divide the results section into our network analyses of the 
government’s coordination network followed by our eight emerging themes for multi-
level, multi-sectoral mega project network governance. 
 
4.1. Network Analysis 
Table 1 provides details of the number of actors for each government ego-network, as 
well as the entire network of 610 actors. Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of each 
government’s network, analyzed using the eigenvector measure and strength of ties (the 
bigger the node and label, the higher the eigenvector value; likewise, tie thickness 
indicates strength). Table 1 also indicates the centrality analyses (betweenness, 
eigenvector, in- and out-reach). We found that, unsurprisingly, both the network and 
each government-level network was not dense given the high number of actors. Table 1 
also demonstrates that the key actors for controlling information (betweenness 
centrality), for being generally important (eigenvector centrality), and for reaching out to 
other actors or being on the receiving end of requests (in- and out-reach) include, most 
notably, the Games organizing committee (VANOC), followed by federal-level 
departments and coordinating committees (Games secretariat and others), and other 
governments’ secretariats and committees created for coordinating efforts related to the 
Games. Thus, the coordinating structures created by the various levels of government to 
help meet their responsibilities for hosting the Games were effective. The dominance of 
federal-level actors in the whole network is also noted and will be discussed in the next 
section. The whole network is depicted in Figure 2, analyzed in the same manner as 
Figure 1, but excluding actors with only one tie to make the network a little easier to read. 
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Figure 1. Individual Government Ego Networks
 
Source: Authors 
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Table 1. Government Network Analysis Number of Ties, Ability to Control 
Information, and Degree of Importance 
 
# of 
Actors 
Densit
y 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
(top 3 measures) 
Eigenvector 
(top 3 measures) 
Reachability 
In-Reach 
(normalized top 3 
measures) 
Reachability 
Out-reach 
(normalized top 
3 measures) 
Average 
Reach 
(normalized) 
Whole  
network  
610  .01  VANOC (37.84) 
BCSEC (9.44) 
DFAIT (8.27) 
VANOC (36.78) 
RWG (28.99) 
2010FS (27.00) 
VANOC (0.51) 
BCSEC (0.43) 
RWG (0.41) 
VANOC (0.58) 
BCSEC (0.48) 
DFAIT (0.47) 
.26 
Federal  449  .01  VANOC (13.86) 
DFAIT (11.73) 
ICIHT (10.37) 
RWG (30.40) 
CBSA (28.30) 
FCN (27.45) 
VANOC (0.32) 
FCN (0.31) 
RWG (0.31) 
FCN (0.49) 
DFAIT (0.48) 
2010FS (0.48) 
.18 
Provincial  189  .01  BCSEC (59.57) 
VANOC (21.92) 
BC (16.99) 
BCSEC (84.71) 
VANOC (31.97) 
2010LN (25.49) 
VANOC (0.18) 
BCSEC (0.15) 
BC (0.15) 
BCSEC (0.55) 
BC (0.35) 
BCSECBC (0.09) 
.07 
Vancouver  144  .01 VOPOO (56.55) 
VANOC (21.22) 
CMHC (17.72) 
VOPOO (75.44) 
VANOC (45.12) 
Rich (26.67) 
VANOC (0.24) 
VOPOO (0.19) 
VTOC (0.15) 
VOPOO (0.46) 
Rich (0.33) 
VTOC (0.32) 
.07 
Whistler  85  .02  W2010 (67.39) 
VANOC (25.26) 
GOT (18.63) 
W2010 (86.87) 
VANOC (36.20) 
GPG (34.67) 
VANOC (0.23)  
VOPOO (0.12) 
MPT (0.12) 
W2010 (0.66) 
GOT (0.44) 
GPG (0.43) 
.07 
VANOC=Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games; 
BCSEC=British Columbia Secretariat for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games; 
RWG=Representatives’ Working Group (federal); DFAIT=Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (federal); 2010FS=2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games Federal Secretariat; 
FCN=Federal Communicators’ Network; CBSA=Canada Border Services Agency; ICIHT=Indian and 
northern affairs Canada’s British Columbia Region Coordination Committee; BC=British Columbia; 
2010LN=2010 Legacies Now; BCSECBC=British Columbia Secretariat Business Committee; VOPOO=City 
of Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Operations Office; Rich=City of Richmond; CMHC=Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation; VTOC=Vancouver Transportation Operation Centre; 
W2010=Whistler 2010 Games Office; GOT=Games Operating Trust; GPG=Government Partners Group; 
MPT=Master Planning Team. 
Source: Authors 
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Figure 2. Whole Government Coordination Network 
 
Source: Authors 
 
We also analyzed each of the 3,900 ties found in the data. Although we started with Knoke 
and Yang’s (2008) types of ties, we could only use certain categories, while other 
categories also emerged. We therefore suggest a new classification of types of ties for 
mega project coordination networks: 
• Transactional: an exchange of resources (e.g., a one-time grant from a government 
department to a non-profit organization); 
• Communication: a sharing of information (oral or written, through face-to-face, 
email, mail, or tele/video-conferencing, such as the Whistler Games secretariat 
conducting a presentation to residents); 
• Instrumental communication: pre-transaction, informal, and exploratory, but 
purposeful (e.g., Industry Canada exploring potential opportunities with Bell 
Canada, a corporate sponsor of the Games); 
• Regulatory: a form of normative power (e.g., the provincial secretariat having an 
overseeing role on VANOC regarding its spending); 
• Legal: network actors that are legally bound (e.g., the MPA signed by all 
governments, as the partners and “owners” of VANOC, and the NAO they created 
to oversee the preparations and coordination of the work for the Games); 
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• Collaboration: a formal or informal partnership without legal attributes as 
identified by actors (e.g., the province’s 2010 Speakers’ Bureau collaborating with 
VANOC to conduct a speakers’ series); 
• Coordinating bridge: committee members of internal-internal (internal to a 
department), internal-external (internal to a government but between 
departments), and external-external (between governments or with other actors) 
links, such as a federal department acting as chair of a cross-government Games 
committee; and 
• Generic internal or external link: a link found in the data but for which no 
additional information was found in order to classify it. 
 
The two dominant types of ties were collaboration, preferred by most, and coordinating 
bridge, preferred by the federal government. Table 2 presents the frequencies for each 
type of tie. Collaboration was also preferred for an event-level and inter-government 
relationship.  
 
Table 2. Type and Frequency of Ties Between Stakeholders 
 
 Colla-
boratio
n  
Commu
-
nication  
Coordinatin
g bridge  
Instrumenta
l  
Legal  Regulator
y  
Transactiona
l  
Internal 
link  
External 
link  
Federal  461  255  1280  2  12  39  61  318  2  
Provincial 64   16   1  3  1  59   
Municipal  66  10  27  5  15  2  2  34   
Event-
specific  
30   1   1    2   
Inter-
governmental  
584  102  235  10  91  26  71  7  5  
Source: Authors. 
 
4.2 Governance Themes 
Nine governance themes emerged associated with governance structure, processes, and 
evaluation: coordination mechanisms; internal engagement, momentum, and motivation; 
external transparency; formalization; balancing autonomy and interdependence; co-
location; readiness exercises; political alignment; and time. Each is described below. 
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These themes are not mutually exclusive but interrelated factors. The interrelationships, 
noted in the descriptions below, are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Interrelationship of Factors Associated with the Governance  
of a Multi-Level, Multi-Sectoral Mega-Project 
 
Source: Authors 
 
Coordination mechanisms. Supporting the network analysis, we found that 
coordination mechanisms/frameworks were important and needed to be established 
during the bid phase (i.e., before a city had won the right to host the event), which is to 
say, before planning/preparing for the Games commenced. Despite being created just 
after being awarding the Games, one federal interviewee noted that secretariats should 
have been created even earlier: “So in terms of coordination, I think that staffing the 
Federal Secretariat here was excellent. I think that should have been done earlier, and 
maybe that would have had more of an impact” (P16). These mechanisms/frameworks 
included forums/committees allowing for stakeholder/interest group participation and 
secretariat-like structures. Such mechanisms should therefore be established at strategic, 
intermediary, and operational levels. Such a structure makes decision making for mega, 
time-limited projects more efficient, as Participant 25 noted: 
So because it's a big project and because it's also a very time-limited project, we 
need the capacity to make decisions very quickly. I think this sort of committee 
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structure helps us to do that, in some ways, because we can get decisions quite 
quickly when needed. 
 
Internal engagement, momentum, and motivation. The success of the relationships 
created through the coordination mechanisms depended largely on the individuals 
representing the organizations, as one federal government employee noted: “The 
relationships are what made the coordination work, and especially at VANOC. That's 
what I found” (P7). Thus, individual and departmental engagement through leadership 
is essential.  
I mean they’re [coordination mechanisms] adequate at say the degree to which 
they do what we need them to do depends on the leadership and the leadership 
certainly now is very much focused on we need to do what we need to do 
corporately to make this a successful game. If that leadership wasn’t there, you 
know, the actions that we would have to take, for example the actions that Parks 
might need to take would not necessarily be so focused (P30). 
 
Participant 15 supported this and compared the success of the coordination mechanisms 
to difficulties experienced during a G8 summit, which was linked to the degree of 
engagement (a whole-of-government approach) of the various departments:  
I think it's really good in the sense that I have previous experience at the G8 
Summit in Kananaskis. … And what was lacking there was a whole-of-
government approach in the sense that departments were really left to themselves 
to go get money, resources, policy decisions. 
 
Associated with engagement are momentum, moving files forward, and motivation. 
Representative turnover hindered momentum, as the following comment highlights: 
It's a long period of time. … So often there was movement within the departments 
on the work. … They had no idea what their department was doing. They had just 
started. So there was a period of time we felt like we were constantly updating 
everybody on what we were doing (P13). 
 
Department motivation was also part of this process:  
I think the biggest challenge for government is finding a way to motivate 
government departments to take action. I think the committees are great for 
information sharing, but they don't always result in anything other than really 
long meetings, right, with minutes (P16). 
 
External transparency. While engagement, momentum, and motivation seem to be an 
internal process, transparency was used as an external process to gain support from the 
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general public and media, and to help with these stakeholders’ degree of engagement. 
But we get letters from the members of the public. We have regular monthly 
question times with the mayor where the mayor is questioned in public by the 
members of the London Assembly. … So, we’re always answering questions of 
one kind or another, either directly or in supporting the mayor in terms of kind of 
accounting to the public (P46). 
 
On the one hand, transparency can be a facilitator of helping to garner trust and decision-
making acceptance, as the following participants pointed out: “[T]o do all that we do in 
a way that is transparent, that we can openly defend” (P1); and “I think transparency, 
absolutely. I guess it links to trust as well, and transparency about how you do your 
business, who you do your business with” (P51). On the other hand, transparency 
processes, such as freedom of information laws, can be perceived as hindering 
momentum: 
Freedom of Information. That's been a big, big issue because the Ministry in 
particular is like, no, no, we're not going to send you that file. Come to the meeting, 
you see the presentation, but because if we get a copy then it is Freedom of 
Information within the City. … VANOC tried to come up with some kind of rules 
of engagement that would protect government partners, maybe, from having 
certain information shared, but it would have been way more work and it's just 
been frustrating (P32). 
 
Formalization. To be successful, the network needed to formalize relationships and 
responsibilities, again before preparations began (i.e., during the bid phase). A key 
document was the MPA, which did just this:  
[The MPA] talks about obligations, benefits. It talks about who's contributing 
what. It talks about who's receiving what. And so we all have commitments to 
each other in the development and execution of the Games. … Ultimately the MPA 
fits in because that’s where the starting obligation is, from the MPA (P39). 
 
Such formalized documents provided clear guidelines and helped reduce potential 
conflicts: “And we’re putting that all down very clearly in black and white so there’s no 
ambiguity between us and the other stakeholders” (P49). 
 
Balancing autonomy and interdependence. As the earlier observation about the G8 
stated, while departments and governments are technically autonomous, they are 
interdependent in such time-limited mega projects. This is particularly important for 
managing cross-sectoral relationships, such as between an Olympic Games Organizing 
Committee (OCOG) like VANOC or LOCOG for the London 2012 Games (independent, 
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non-profit organizations) and government partners. Participant 52 supported this 
assertion:  
[T]he IOC requires there to be a sort of independent organizing committee out of 
LOCOG who weren’t a direct public body. So that’s quite an uncomfortable place 
for government to be in sometimes in that they are very much dependent and 
reliant upon a body over which they’ve got influence, but not direct control. And 
yet if the OCOG is not performing that has massive implications for how the 
country is viewed internationally. 
 
Thus, coordinating mechanisms and formalizing relationships and procedures helped 
balance organizational autonomy and interdependence. 
 
Co-location. Co-location or physical proximity in the same building was identified not 
only for the Vancouver 2010 Games—Vancouver is three time zones away from Ottawa, 
Canada’s capital—but also for London, and was noted by Participant 53 as an issue in 
past Games: 
One of the things I’m very glad we did do was to put these two organizations 
[LOCOG & Olympic Delivery Authority] in the same building, which sounds like 
a trivial, superficial thing. But actually, the difference being that when there was a 
problem, that you could walk to someone else’s office and rather than sending 
them an email, a letter or demanding a meeting you could just walk over to their 
office and start shouting at them. It helped to bring those two organizations 
together and to make them work as a team in some ways.  
 
Readiness exercises. To ensure that the coordination mechanisms, lines of 
communication, and actors’ responsibilities are ready, readiness exercises or test events 
were conducted. This was noted by Participant 14: 
Like the provincial government, we work with them on the emergency side of 
things to try to make sure things are running smoothly on the communication 
provincially. And from a municipal perspective too, a lot of the municipal 
governments that are involved, we have interactions with them, especially 
through the exercises themselves and all of the meetings we have for coordination 
of the exercises.  
 
Such exercises served as evaluations for the degree of preparedness by the actors and the 
network (e.g., testing lines of communication between actors in the network). Any issues 
found through the exercises resulted in modifications to the coordination network and 
its processes. 
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Political alignment. Political alignment, continuity, or unity helped support the overall 
goal of the network, ensuring a more effective and efficient process. The following remark 
from Participant 49 illustrates the point well: 
It [the Olympic Board] still embraces all of the political parties. So, I have to say 
from the top end, so that’s done very well. … There was continuity and support. I 
have to say there’s been great support for this project. I mean, one of the things we 
worked out was that whatever happened in terms of the middle years of this 
project, which could have been the most difficult, we realized that whatever 
government was in power in 2012, this was going to be their party, their event.  
 
Political alignment, then, was a contextual factor affecting the overall process. 
 
Time. The unmovable deadline of the Games’ opening ceremonies helped create 
momentum and push actors to work together towards a common goal: “I didn’t think 
there was any doubt that working to an absolutely immovable fixed date creates a 
momentum and the sense of common purpose to get things sorted out” (P47). However, 
time was “a double-edged sword” (P15). A lack of time could result a crisis response: 
“The more they can delay making a decision, the more time is against us because at some 
point, it becomes a crisis” (P17). 
 
5.0 Discussion 
5.1. Network Implications 
The network analysis undertaken demonstrated the complexity of hosting a mega project 
like the Olympic Games. The presence of multiple types of ties and aspects to govern the 
network (e.g., coordination mechanism, co-location, readiness exercises) highlights the 
need for “flexibility and responsiveness for service provision” (Bogason & Musso, 2006, 
p. 3). In examining the types of ties, we argue that the choice of tie seems to depend on 
the actor’s goal(s) within the network. For example, the Canadian federal government 
focused on a whole-of-government approach, which was broader and more strategic, 
whereas the municipalities focused on operational aspects (e.g., being effective service 
providers and venue developers) and the partnerships. As well, we found a possible link 
between the type of tie choice and the perception of participation. Whereas the federal 
government focused on horizontal management (i.e., public service participation), 
municipalities focused on their residents (i.e., public participation). These reasons may 
explain the differing emphasis on collaboration versus coordinating bridge ties. 
Moreover, we contribute to the literature by offering different types of ties for our large 
network context. There were logically no sentiment or kinship types of ties (cf., Knoke & 
Yang, 2008). Boundary penetration relations were observed as coordinating bridges and 
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authority/power relations were modified to regulatory relations to highlight the 
normative forms of power present. 
 
Despite different organizational objectives, the governments—or, at least, the provincial 
and municipal governments—had very similar structures, in that the strongest link was 
between VANOC and the government’s coordinating secretariat. Each of these two actors 
could be seen as brokers for their respective network cliques (VANOC and its event 
network, the secretariat and its government’s actors). This placed these two actors in 
powerful positions. Thus, the network coordination structures of these governments 
seemed to follow similar structural characteristics as indicated by past research with 
other industries (cf., Burt, 2000). Looking at the whole network, we found that VANOC 
dominated as expected, but so, too, did federal-level actors. This would suggest that 
although multi-level governance structures can assist local/regional and supra-national 
actors in gaining prominence (Zürn, Wälti, & Enderlein, 2010)—the implication being 
that the importance of national governments decreases—our findings do not support this 
statement outside the policy development network area, as most research on multi-level 
governance has indicated. In the case of multi-level, multi-sectoral mega-projects, we 
found that the national-level government dominated the network along with the NAO. 
 
5.2 Governance Implications 
To govern a large multi-level, multi-sectoral network, our findings indicated a need for 
coordination mechanisms that helped to balance actors’ autonomy and interdependence 
(cf., Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), internal and external support of the network through 
engagement/motivation/momentum (cf., Latham, 2012), mutual transparency (cf., 
Grigorescu, 2003) to build trust (cf. Lane & Bachmann, 1998) between actors, formalizing 
(cf. Hall, Haas, & Johnson, 1967) the coordination mechanisms and co-locating the actors 
to reduce potential conflicts, and readiness exercises to test the network’s effectiveness 
and efficiency. These processes were impacted by the degree of political alignment 
throughout the project’s lifecycle and that unmovable deadline: time. As such, proper 
governance of large networks involving multi-level and multi-sectorial actors requires a 
combination of strategic management, organization theory, organizational behaviour, 
and public and international management concepts. This suggests that examining such 
networks requires a more holistic, integrative view of the situation. While examining a 
particular aspect of the network’s governance (e.g., structure or process or evaluation) is 
appropriate and needed, researchers must be aware of where their study fits within the 
larger framework of theoretical concepts impacting such networks. 
 
With G8, world summits, and other global gatherings seemingly increasing in frequency, 
it becomes important to consider multi-level and multi-sectoral networks and how they 
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are coordinated and managed. The themes presented in this study provide a basic 
framework for examining the governance of multi-level, multi-sectoral networks created 
to undertake a mega project. Within the coordinating mechanisms, actors have at their 
disposal a variety of ties (chief among them collaboration and coordinating bridges), as 
found in this study. Moreover, this framework indicates how a network’s public and non-
profit organizations’ activities and procedures can be influenced, modified, and impacted 
by the other actors (other public or non-profit organizations). 
 
The network’s high number of actors and strong multiplexity also create significant 
challenges for accountability and performance management, both key parts of 
democratic governance (Callahan, 2007). Accountability rests on clear roles and 
responsibilities, clear expectations, and the possibility to know and assess who has done 
what, how, and when. Formalization and coordination mechanisms, amongst other 
themes, become critical to help foster accountability. At their core, they need to make it 
clear to all stakeholders who is accountable to whom and for what. However, the sheer 
size of the network makes it very difficult to not only build but maintain successful 
network-level accountability, especially regarding evaluation. In fact, the joint federally 
and provincially funded independent evaluation report commissioned with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers was cancelled due to funding issues post-Games and before the 
end of the contract (i.e., before the longer-term impacts could be evaluated). Moreover, 
network-level accountability may not be desirable. Trying to be accountable to everyone 
in the network may result in dilution of accountability. Participant 52 acknowledged this 
point: “I mean in some ways you wouldn’t want everybody being accountable because 
there’s a danger that no one’s accountable.” Likewise, the complex nature of the network 
(a high number of actors and tie multiplexity) makes performance management rather 
elusive. What part of the performance is to be managed (e.g., all linkages, all actors), who 
should manage the performance (i.e., the NAO, the rights holder) and how? Performance 
and accountability can perhaps be determined for individual actors, but aggregating this 
information to a 600-plus actor network becomes difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, 
nothing suggests that organizational performance and accountability is a simple or 
complex aggregation of individual performance. Even the concept of transparency, a 
pillar of democratic governance, becomes difficult. However, our study demonstrates 
that externally focused transparency, as elusive as it may be, remains an important issue 
for gaining public support. In the end, the blurring of boundaries affects not only the 
dynamic between (international) private and (federal, provincial, local) public 
organizations, but clearly between actors within the public sphere itself. Inasmuch as 
accountability is a democratic requirement, and that it can only begin with transparency, 
it appears that network governance comes with its own issues and problems, not only in 
terms of efficacy and efficiency (managerial concerns), but, most prominently, in terms 
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of democratic imperatives. More theoretically, our research questions the often-assumed 
complementary nature of network and democratic governance, and leads us to wonder 
if they are not, in fact, mutually exclusive, or trapped in a zero-sum game.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In summary, we sought to examine how the three levels of government in Canada 
established a network of over 600 actors to coordinate efforts for hosting a mega project, 
the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games. They did so by using a variety of types of 
ties, building coordinating mechanisms, including using a NAO, formalization, and 
readiness exercises. These were assisted by internal engagement, motivation, and 
momentum, as well as external transparency and co-location, in order to balance the 
autonomy and interdependence of the network’s various actors. Political alignment and 
time formed a contextual background to these processes.  
 
This study, of course, has limitations, which are in fact opportunities for future research. 
First, the Vancouver and London settings are relatively similar, which aided comparison. 
However, transferability of information to non-G8, developing countries and BRIC 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries cannot be assumed. What would be the impact of 
these countries’ political context on multi-level, multi-sectoral mega-project network 
coordination? Second, the large number of actors posed limits on our ability to analyze 
the network, even if we limited inquiry to committee, department, and organizational-
level actors, thereby excluding the individual level. We did find that we were able to 
garner the same general findings from a more restricted network (i.e., London 2012), 
which would allow future research to eschew such levels of detail. Space limitations also 
prevented additional analyses of smaller government networks. Future research could 
therefore consider one government level only and go into greater analytical detail, linking 
findings with network administration structures, multi-level governance (Piattoni, 2009), 
and quasi-federalism (Romney, 1999) to foster further discussion on this topic. Third, we 
presented nine key themes that emerged from the data, and noted their 
interrelationships. Testing the interrelationships would be required, as would further 
examination of other possible themes in a variety of other large network and/or mega-
project settings. Finally, our findings lead us to ask: With such large networks, can we 
realistically speak of network or democratic governance principles? Re-conceptualizing 
“network-level” accountability, performance, participation, and transparency seem to be 
required. The blurring of boundaries does not only affect the dynamic between 
(international) private and (federal, provincial, local) public organizations, but also 
between actors within the public sphere itself. Are network governance and democratic 
governance antithetical to one another? Or is it more a function of size and complexity 
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than a consequence of the network form? We hope to see future research examine these 
questions. 
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